closedhumanPR #37Auth
Auth: manifest-bound delegatable capability tokens
Problem #04 — Delegatable capability tokens with cascading revocation.
Author
@Charanarravindaa
github profile →- Status
- Closed without merging
- Opened on
- Jun 24
- Branch
- hackathon/charan-policy-enforcement
Description
The pitch.
# [Hackathon] Auth: manifest-bound delegatable capability tokens ## Problem Picked **Problem #04 — Delegatable capability tokens with cascading revocation.** **Layer 5 — Auth.** This PR adds `auth: delegatable`, a reference Auth-layer plugin for manifest-bound delegatable capability tokens, plus the required adversarial validators and `scenarios/delegated_auth.yaml` proof scenario. It stays inside the existing 12-layer stack and does not introduce a new framework layer. ## Why The default `jwt` auth plugin can issue and verify bearer tokens, but it cannot model the delegation pattern called out in problem #04: > agent A holds a root token; agent A mints a short-lived, narrower token for agent B; revoking A's token invalidates B's token at the next verify. That pattern matters for agent swarms because orchestrators routinely need constrained handoffs: - "You may call this tool, but not pass broader authority onward." - "You may buy this item, but only within my delegated capability." - "You may act for me until this parent token expires or is revoked." - "You may use this sub-capability, but only as the declared audience." This PR makes that capability-delegation contract testable under attack in Nanda Town. ## Core Idea `DelegatableAuth` issues root tokens whose scopes are clamped to a signed manifest. A holder can mint a child token for another audience, but only under stricter caveats: - **Manifest-bound roots:** root scopes are clamped to tools allowed by the signed `PolicyManifest`. - **Strict scope narrowing:** child scopes must be a strict subset of parent scopes. - **TTL containment:** child expiry cannot exceed parent expiry. - **Audience binding:** a token minted for one agent cannot be presented by another. - **Cascading revocation:** revoking any token invalidates that token and all descendants. - **Tamper resistance:** manifest tampering and token payload/signature tampering are rejected. The plugin is a deterministic, in-memory reference implementation for the Nanda Town test rig. Distributed revocation and cross-process token registry replication are intentionally out of scope. ## Adversarial Contract Problem #04 requires validators that catch three attacks. This PR ships all three: | Attack | Baseline `auth: jwt` | This PR `auth: delegatable` | |---|---|---| | Scope escalation | FAIL: broader child authority can be accepted via baseline re-issuance | PASS: child scopes must be a strict subset of parent scopes | | Stale parent | FAIL: revoking parent authority does not invalidate separately issued child token | PASS: descendant verification checks revoked ancestors | | Audience confusion | FAIL: baseline verification does not bind delegated presentation to the child audience | PASS: presenter must match token audience | The bundled scenario builds the required delegation tree: one coordinator, three intermediaries, and twelve leaves. ## What Ships - `nest_plugins_reference.auth.delegatable.DelegatableAuth` - minimal signed-manifest primitives used to clamp Auth scopes - entry-point registration for `auth: delegatable` - `scenarios/delegated_auth.yaml` - `delegated_auth` built-in scenario with coordinator, 3 intermediaries, and 12 leaves - adversarial validators: - `delegated_auth_scope_containment` - `delegated_auth_no_stale_parent` - `delegated_auth_audience_binding` - unit tests for scope clamping, delegation, revocation, TTL, audience binding, tampering, and plugin resolution - property tests for strict scope containment, transitive revocation, and deterministic token generation - end-to-end tests showing `auth: delegatable` PASS and `auth: jwt` FAIL ## Security Properties Covered By Tests - unsigned manifests are deny-all - signed manifests widened after signing do not grant new authority - duplicate root scopes are deduplicated - child scopes must be narrower than parent scopes - equal-scope delegation is rejected - out-of-parent scope escalation is rejected - child TTL beyond par …
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