closedhumanPR #74Privacy
andrea-cola: medical data exchange scenario for hybrid_x25519 privacy
- Adds a new Tier-1 scenario, medical_data_exchange.yaml, exercising the hybrid_x25519 plugin's selective-disclosure path in a medical-data workflow (1 hospital + 3 insurers + 1 auditor).
Author
@andrea-cola
github profile →- Status
- Closed without merging
- Opened on
- Jul 6
- Branch
- hackathon/andrea-cola-privacy-medical-exchange
Description
The pitch.
## Summary - Adds a new Tier-1 scenario, `medical_data_exchange.yaml`, exercising the `hybrid_x25519` plugin's selective-disclosure path in a **medical-data workflow** (1 hospital + 3 insurers + 1 auditor). This covers a use case called out in the plugin's own docstring but not exercised by any existing scenario — `sealed_bid_with_privacy.yaml` only tests `encrypt`/`decrypt`. - Adds `test_medical_exchange.py` with **14 tests** including a **fifth adversarial check** not present in the existing test suite: **cross-agent proof replay**. A valid proof anchored to patient-A's credential root is replayed against a verifier expecting patient-B's root; the Merkle-root binding defeats it. - Confirms `noop` fails where `hybrid_x25519` succeeds: noop leaks all plaintext and accepts replayed proofs. ### What it covers | Test class | # | What it proves | |---|---|---| | `TestMedicalSelectiveDisclosure` | 4 | Hospital proves different field subsets to each insurer; hidden fields never leak | | `TestCrossAgentProofReplay` | 2 | Proof for root-A fails verification under root-B; tampered root fails | | `TestNoopFailsWhereHybridSucceeds` | 5 | noop leaks plaintext, accepts replayed proofs; hybrid blocks both | | `TestEncryptedMedicalExchange` | 3 | Full encrypt+prove round-trip, eavesdropper blocked, revoked insurer excluded | ### Design decisions - **Scenario-only, no plugin changes.** The `hybrid_x25519` plugin is already solid. This PR adds coverage for its selective-disclosure code path in a domain (medical data) that motivates the plugin's existence but had no scenario. - **Cross-agent replay** is distinct from the existing 4 attacks (eavesdropper, replay, field-injection, stale-revocation). It targets the proof layer rather than the encryption layer: a valid credential proof from one session must not transfer to a session anchored to a different credential root. - **Deterministic** — salt seeds are explicit, all tests are reproducible. ## Test plan All CI checks pass locally: ```bash uv sync uv run ruff check . # 0 errors uv run ruff format --check . # 0 reformats uv run pyright # 0 errors uv run pytest -v # 790 passed (including 14 new) ``` ## Persona `privacy-engineer` — the test design reflects credential-lifecycle thinking: credential issuance (commitment), selective proving (audience-scoped disclosure), and cross-session replay resistance (root binding). The scenario models a real regulated workflow (medical data exchange under selective disclosure) rather than a generic test harness.
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